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The E.U. Model as an Adoptable Approach 
for U.S. Privacy Laws:  A Comparative 
Analysis of Data Collection Laws in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and  
the United States 
LAURA YBARRA∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a statement evoking Orwellian images, former Google CEO 
Eric Schmidt spoke about the possibility of his company improving its 
search engine:  “We don’t need you to type at all. We know where you 
are. We know where you’ve been. We can more or less know what 
you’re thinking about.”1 In a later television appearance on CNN, the 
former CEO did little to assuage privacy concerns over Google’s Street 
View map, a service that provides panoramic views from various 
positions along many streets in the world, when he said:  “We drive 
exactly once. So you can just move, right?”2 Schmidt’s comments 
underscore not only the pervasiveness of technology but also its 
implications on an individual’s privacy in a technological age. It is this 
unanticipated ubiquity of technology that has Europeans and Americans 
alike confronted with the functionality of privacy laws in an age of data 
collection. 
In 2009, Germany passed amendments to the country’s Federal  
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 1. Catharine Smith, Google CEO Eric Schmidt’s Most Controversial Quotes About 
Privacy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/04/google-
ceo-eric-schmidt-privacy_n_776924.html#s170420. 
 2.  Wilson Rothman, Don’t Like Google Street View? Just Move, Says CEO, TECHNOLOG 
ON NBCNEWS.COM TECH (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.technolog.msnbc.msn.com/technology/technolog/dont-google-street-view-just-move-
says-ceo-126480. 
  
268 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:267 
Data Protection Act.3 These amendments covered a broad range of data 
collection issues including a requirement of notification of data security 
breaches4 and changes in data marketing rules.5 The 2009 amendments 
also called for increased fines for violations of the law,6 and expanded 
the powers of the supervisory authority.7 
Germany has sparred with American technology companies Apple, 
Facebook, and Google. The country has launched investigations into 
how these companies collect and store personal data.8 For instance, 
German officials asked Google to turn over data from home wireless 
networks that were collected while the company compiled information 
for its Street View map.9 German data-protection officials launched 
legal proceedings in August 2010 because of how Facebook handles 
non-user information.10 German officials questioned Apple about the 
duration and the type of personal information the company stores on its 
iPhone 4.11 
By contrast, U.K. laws take a more hands-off approach to privacy 
laws compared to their German counterparts. A 2009 European 
Commission Union (E.C.) report admonished the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) about its privacy laws.12 The E.C. report concluded that the U.K. 
violated European Union (E.U.) rules by failing to adequately protect its 
citizens’ personal data.13 The E.C. cited the lack of an independent 
national authority to supervise interception of communications,14 and 
further urged the government to enact laws that ensured safeguards in 
 
 3. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 1, 2002, BGBL. I, 
last amended by Gesetz [G], Sept. 1, 2009, BGBL. I (Ger.).  
 4. Id. § 42(a), § 33. 
 5. Id. § 30(a), § 28(a), § 32. 
 6. Id. § 43. 
 7. Id. § 23, § 38. 
 8. Google-Street-View Tours Also Used for Scanning WLAN-Networks, FED. 
COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION & FREEDOM INFO. (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/PublicRelations/PressReleases/2010/GoogleWLANScan.html?nn=4
10214 [hereinafter Commissioner’s Press Release]. See also Kevin O’Brien, Despite Privacy 
Inquiries, Germans Flock to Google, Facebook and Apple, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at B8.  
 9. Commissioner’s Press Release, supra note 8; see also Kevin O’Brien, Google Balks at 
Turning Over Data to Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at B3. 
 10. Christopher Lawton & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Google Rouses Privacy Concerns in 
Germany—Mapping Service Sparks Debate as Nation Scarred by Authoritarian Past Grapples 
With Personal Data in Digital Age, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2010, at B5.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Press Release, European Union, Telecoms: Commission Steps Up UK Legal Action over 
Privacy and Personal Data Protection, (Oct. 29, 2009), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1626. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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compliance with E.U. laws.15  
The U.K.’s approach to handling data breaches has differed 
notably from that of Germany. For instance, as Google gathered data for 
its Street View map and collected personal information from wireless 
Internet networks, including passwords and e-mail messages, the 
company avoided fines in the U.K. merely by promising to take steps to 
avoid any repetition of what Google described as “inadvertent” 
incidents.16 The company also agreed to delete the data it collected and 
provide training for its employees on privacy issues.17 
Although the United Kingdom and Germany have taken different 
approaches to regulating privacy, more and more of their citizens are 
joining Facebook, searching on Google, and using Apple products.18 
These differences reveal a growing rift between E.U. laws and 
consumer behavior in a technological society.19 This split has 
confronted European countries with a quandary of how to draft 
legislation that reconciles the competing interests of data protection 
laws, technology companies’ desire to enter the European market, and 
consumer attitudes towards individual privacy in a culture where 
technology and social media are ubiquitous.20 
The United States government is also struggling to adopt stricter 
data collection privacy laws at the urging of consumer advocates. A 
draft Internet privacy law was released to the public in May 2010 by 
Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns, members of the House 
of Representative’s Subcommittee on Communications, Technology 
and the Internet.21 The draft bill called for privacy notices to be clearly 
marked on websites and for these notices to include how the 
information is stored.22 The proposed bill made distinctions between 
data that could be used only with the user’s consent and data that could 
be used until the user opted-out.23 The bill was met with criticism from 
advertising lobbyists and consumer advocates alike.24 
 
 15. Id.  
 16. Eric Pfanner, British Agency Says Google Violated Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/technology/04google.html. 
 17. Id.  
 18. O’Brien, supra note 8. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See e.g., Christopher Lawton, Google Street View Sparks New German Privacy Code, 
WALL  ST. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at B4. 
 21. H.R., 111TH CONG. (Discussion Draft May 3, 2010) [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Id. at 12. 
 24. Diane Bartz, John McCain, John Kerry Introduce Contentious U.S. Privacy Bill, 
REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/us-congress-privacy-
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Like Europe, the United States has taken varying approaches to 
data collection issues. For example, it was reported in October 2010 that 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was dropping its investigation of 
the information Google had obtained during preparation for the launch 
of its Street View mapping service.25 The investigation ended with 
Google agreeing to improve its data collection process and provide 
privacy training for its employees.26 Nevertheless, Congress took notice 
after the Wall Street Journal reported in October 2010 that Facebook 
applications, or “apps,” were passing on private user information to 
advertisers.27 Congressmen Joe Barton and Edward Markey, co-
chairmen of the House’s Bipartisan Privacy Caucus, sent a letter to 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg asking for more details about how the 
company’s applications handle personal data.28 After receiving a 
response from Marne Levine, Vice President of Global Public Policy for 
Facebook,29 the Congressmen said they wanted to take up the topic 
when Congress resumed its 2011 session.30 
This Note will explore whether the European Union’s privacy laws 
could serve as a model for the United States. Currently, U.S. data 
collection laws are regulated by a patchwork system of state and federal 
laws and agencies.31 The E.U.’s 1995 Directive on Data Protection, on 
the other hand, mandated that each E.U. nation pass national privacy 
laws and called for the creation of a Data Protection Authority to protect 
 
idUSTRE73B59E20110412. 
 25. Grant Gross, FTC Closes Investigation into Google’s Wi-Fi Snooping, TECHWORLD, 
(Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/365929/ftc_closes_investigation_into_google_wi-
fi_snooping/?fp=4&fpid=16. 
 26.  John D. Sutter, FTC Ends Google ‘Street View’ Investigation Without Fines, CNN (Oct. 
27, 2010, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/10/27/ftc.google.investigation/index.html?eref=rss_tech&
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_tech+(RSS
%3A+Technology). 
 27. Emily Steel & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304772804575558484075236968.html; 
see also Letter from Marne Levine, Vice President, Global Public Policy at Facebook, to Edward 
Markey, Congressman, and Joe Barton, Congressman, Bi-Partisan Privacy Caucus (Oct. 29, 
2010) [hereinafter Letter from Marne Levine], available at 
http://Republicans.EnergyCommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Letters/102910_Facebook_Response_
Barton_Markey.pdf. 
 28.  Letter from Marne Levine, supra note 27.   
 29. Id. 
 30. Facebook Responds to Barton, Markey, HOUSE ENERGY & COM. COMMITTEE (Nov. 3, 
2010), http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=8085. 
 31. Ken D. Kumayama, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 434 (2009); see, 
e.g., The Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579 
(2004), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 201. 
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citizens’ privacy.32 The E.U. model allows for variation of data 
collection laws by allowing its member countries to determine their own 
laws.33 It is this degree of latitude, however, that has resulted in a 
disharmony of laws within the European Union.34 
Part II of this note begins with an overview of current data 
collection privacy laws in the United States and further analyzes the 
May 2010 Congressional Internet privacy draft bill. Part III traces E.U. 
data collection privacy laws and the diverging standards that have 
emerged in the United Kingdom and Germany. Part IV provides the 
comparative analysis of data collection privacy laws in the United 
States and the European Union. This section analyzes the strengths and 
limitations of the proposed bill, and analyzes which features from the 
E.U. model would best serve federal legislation in the United States. 
Finally, Part V concludes that while the E.U. model provides an 
umbrella legislative system that would improve the patchwork system 
of current U.S. data collection privacy laws, the United States should 
strengthen FTC enforcement powers and preempt state laws to avoid the 
disharmony of the E.U. system. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF U.S. LAW 
A.  A Patchwork System of Data Collection Standards  
The United States Supreme Court recognized the fundamental 
right to privacy in the seminal 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut.35 
There, the Court found that the Bill of Rights provided penumbras of 
privacy as it struck down a law that forbade the use of contraceptives.36 
Scholars have argued that privacy in the United States is based upon the 
value of liberty.37 The notion of privacy as a liberty interest has been 
 
 32.  Council Directive 95/46, arts. 27–28, Oct. 12, 1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) [hereinafter 
Council Directive 95/46], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1995L0046:20031120:EN:PDF. 
 33. See, e.g., Commission Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy 
Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments, A.4—Germany, final 
(June 2010) [hereinafter A.4—Germany], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_cou
ntry_report_A4_germany.pdf.  
 34. Compare Commission Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy 
Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments: A.6—United 
Kingdom, EUR. COMM’N (June 2010) [hereinafter A.6—United Kingdom], available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/ 
final_report_country_report_A6_united_kingdom.pdf, with A.4—Germany, supra note 33. 
 35. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 36. Id. at 483 (discussing penumbras within the Bill of Rights that create zones of privacy). 
 37. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
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exhibited in the Court’s treatment of several contentious social issues 
such as abortion38 and homosexuality.39 Furthermore, case law in the 
United States has recognized the right of privacy free from 
governmental intrusion.40 While decisional privacy has been protected, 
informational privacy has yet to receive such broad protection from the 
Supreme Court.41 Instead, informational privacy has become rooted in 
statutory law, common law, agency regulations, and self-regulatory 
principles.42  
1.  Ineffective FTC Regulation of Online Privacy 
Congress formed the FTC in 191443 in an effort to stop unfair 
methods of competition in commerce.44 With its creation, Congress 
granted the FTC a large degree of power.45 Since 1938, the FTC has 
been empowered to prevent corporations from using “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” under Section 45 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.46 Courts have treated the FTC’s 
decisions with deference, thus allowing the FTC to possess quasi-
legislative power to enact regulations.47  
Today, the FTC is the leading regulating authority of online 
privacy issues in the United States.48 However, the FTC has placed 
limitations upon its own regulatory power. On the issue of online 
privacy, for example, the FTC noted that it “lacks authority to require 
firms to adopt information practice policies or to abide by the fair 
information practice principles on their Web sites, or portions of their 
Web sites, not directed to children.”49 Recently, the FTC conceded that 
 
YALE L.J. 1153, 1161 (2004).  
 38. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 39. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 40. Kumayama, supra note 31, at 435–36.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 434–35. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
 43. About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan 5, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm.   
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2000-title15/pdf/USCODE-2000-title15-chap2-
subchapI.pdf. 
 47. Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1321 (2001). 
 48. Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach 
Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2008). 
 49. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1324. See Twitter Settles Charges That It Failed to Protect 
Consumers’ Personal Information; Company Will Establish Independently Audited Information 
Security Program, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, (June 24, 2011), 
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more regulation of online privacy was needed and suggested a universal 
“Do Not Track” mechanism as a guard for online privacy.50 The FTC, 
however, argued that Congress should provide such regulation.51 
The FTC does, however, bring complaints against companies that 
violate their published privacy policies.52 David Vladeck, the director of 
the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, affirmed that promise in a 
2010 statement:  “When a company promises consumers that their 
personal information is secure, it must live up to that promise.”53  In 
2010, the FTC brought its first data security case against a social 
network.54 In that suit, the FTC alleged that Twitter failed “to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security to prevent unauthorized access to 
nonpublic user information and honor the privacy choices exercised by 
its users.”55 The breach resulted in two incidents where intruders were 
able to reset account passwords.56 In one instance, the intruder tweeted 
from then-presidential candidate Barack Obama’s account, offering his 
followers a chance to win $500 in gasoline.57 In an agreement with the 
FTC, Twitter agreed to strengthen its non-public consumer information 
and further agreed to third-party assessments of its privacy procedures.58  
In March 2011, Google agreed to settle charges that it violated its 
own privacy promises to consumers with its launch of Google Buzz.59 
Google agreed to implement a “comprehensive privacy program” and 
agreed to privacy audits for twenty years.60 Yet the fact that the FTC has 
 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm. 
 50. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 4–5 (2012). available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 51. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1325. 
 52. Scott, supra note 48, at 129. 
 53. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Twitter Settles Charges That It Failed to 
Protect Consumers’ Personal Information; Company Will Establish Independently Audited 
Information Security Program (June 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm. 
 54. Complaint, Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011) [hereinafter Twitter Complaint]. 
 55. Id. ¶ 11. 
 56. Id. ¶ 12(a). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Agreement, Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011) [hereinafter Twitter Agreement]. 
 59. Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Google Inc., File No. 102 3136, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf [hereinafter Google 
Agreement]. The FTC complaint alleged that Google users were not adequately informed that the 
default setting allowed frequent contacts to be public. Complaint, Google, Inc., File No. 102 3136 
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/110330googlebuzzcmpt.pdf. See also 
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Google's 
Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm [hereinafter FTC Press Release].  
 60. Google Agreement, supra note 59, at 4–5. 
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only brought a limited number of cases against social networking sites 
is indicative of the agency’s hesitance to provide stronger regulation of 
data collection practices.61  
2.  Sporadic state regulation of privacy rights 
States have provided constitutional privacy rights, but these rights 
have not been focused on informational privacy.62 Because of the 
federal and state governments’ sporadic regulation of informational 
privacy, only serious invasions of privacy interests have been 
recognized.63 Informational privacy issues are generally analyzed under 
common law privacy torts.64 Under common law, an invasion of privacy 
cause of action could be brought under:  (1) the placement of someone 
in a false light; (2) the public disclosure of private facts; (3) the 
intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or solitude; or (4) appropriation of a 
person’s name or likeness.65 This approach has caused scholars to 
debate whether informational privacy should extend so far as to fit 
within one of these causes of action.66  
The case law within the United States suggests, however, that 
courts have not extended informational privacy protection within the 
invasion of privacy tort.67 New Jersey, for example, recognized an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet service 
provider (ISP) records in the 2008 case State v. Reid.68 There, however, 
the court focused on the notion of privacy when the government was the 
actor.69 It is likely that a different result would have been reached had 
the actor been a private entity.  
Indeed, a Pennsylvania court reached a different decision where 
the actor was a private entity. In Boring v. Google, Inc., the court held 
that images of the plaintiff’s house from Google’s Street View did not 
rise to the level of invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion.70 
There, the court reasoned that the photographs were less intrusive than a 
knock on the front door, and thus concluded that the plaintiffs did not 
suffer a substantial injury.71 In December 2010, however, Google paid 
 
 61. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1321.  
 62. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386–88 (1960). 
 63. See Twitter Complaint, supra note 54, ¶ 11; State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008). 
 64. Prosser, supra note 62, at 389. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1317–18. 
 67. See Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 68. See Reid, supra note 63 at 28. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Boring, supra note 67 at 280. 
 71. Id. at 279.  
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the plaintiffs one dollar in nominal damages when the company entered 
a consent judgment for trespassing.72 This judgment prevented higher 
courts from further analyzing the issue of privacy.  
Because of the limitations of recovery for plaintiffs under the 
common law system, many states have enacted legislation to provide its 
citizens with far greater informational privacy protection.73 These laws, 
however, have focused too narrowly upon particular issues to provide 
any cohesiveness for a set of uniform informational privacy laws in the 
United States. For instance, in California, credit card companies are 
required to notify the consumer about the privacy policy and, 
furthermore, the consumers are given an option to opt-out.74 This is 
similar to a Virginia statute that prohibits, in certain limited 
circumstances, the information gathered “solely as the result of any 
customer payment . . . by credit card” unless the merchant gives notice 
to the consumer.75 Along the same vein, a number of states have enacted 
“Do Not Call” lists that ban telemarketers.76  Some states have also 
turned their attention to spam e-mail messages. For example, Tennessee 
requires subject headings to be designated with “ADV,” or an 
advertising label.77 These diverse measures, however, exemplify the 
discontinuity of informational privacy laws enacted by states; instead of 
providing citizens with blanket legislation that provides protection of 
data collection practices, states focused on singular practices.  
B.  Proposed Bill:  Stronger Federal Regulations, But Lack  
of Consistent Standards  
In an attempt to provide cohesive data collection laws that protect 
informational privacy, federal legislators have proposed legislation that 
would provide blanket regulation of data collection. It should be noted 
that federal legislation is beneficial because it can provide clear 
standards, align with consumer behaviors, and allow for amendments 
more quickly than case law.78 In May 2010, Representatives Rich 
 
 72. Defendant Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Pending Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 08-cv-694), available at 
http://www.zegarelli.com/Cases/Borings%20v%20Google/Google%20Response%20to%20Motio
n%20web.pdf (consent judgment).  
 73. See Sovern, supra note 47, at 1312–15. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-442 (1998), 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.12(b) (West 1998). 
 74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.12(b) (West 1998); see Sovern, supra note 47, at 1315. 
 75. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1315; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-442 (1998).  
 76. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1315. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.475 (West 2006). 
 77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(e) (Supp. 2000); Sovern, supra note 47, at 1317.  
 78. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 47, at 1312–13. 
  
276 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:267 
Boucher and Cliff Stearns, members of the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet, 
introduced a draft bill that proposed new Internet privacy regulations.79 
The unnamed bill was met with criticism from both Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress.  
The proposed bill expanded the definition of sensitive information 
to include an individual’s Internet Protocol (I.P.) address, name, race or 
ethnicity, precise location, or any user-entered preference profile.80 
Hence, if any of this personal information could be used to identify a 
user, companies would be required to provide users with notice.81 The 
proposal would require companies to include descriptions of how the 
information is collected, stored, and the duration of the data storage.82 
The issues of consent and opt-out were heavily disputed in the 
2010 draft bill. Under the proposal, an individual is deemed to have 
consented to the collection of data by either affirmatively granting 
consent or failing to decline consent at the time a clear statement is 
conveyed to the individual.83 Thus, the proposal allowed for implied 
consent. Privacy advocates like Jeffrey Chester, the Director for the 
Center for Digital Democracy, were disappointed that the proposal 
relied upon consent.84 Chester said, “The flaw is that it forces consumers 
to rely on digital fine print. It’s still buried in the privacy policies.”85  
While this requirement applied to marketers and advertisers, the 
bill made exceptions for entities that delete information within eighteen 
months.86 Nevertheless, advertisers and marketers found the notice 
requirement too restrictive.87 They argued that behavior advertising 
allows everyone to benefit from free Internet service.88 If consent 
notices were required, then costs would be imposed upon Internet 
 
 79. Discussion Draft, supra note 21. 
 80. Id. §§ 2(5), 2(6), 2(8)–2(11). 
 81. Id. § 3(a). 
 82. Id. § 3(a)(2)(B). 
 83. Id. § 3(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
 84. See Stephanie Clifford, Privacy Bill Finally in Draft, as Both Sides Weigh In, MEDIA 
DECODER BLOG (May 4, 2010, 2:14 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/privacy-bill-finally-in-draft-as-both-sides-
weigh-in/. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Discussion Draft, supra note 21, § 3(e)(2). 
 87. Clifford, supra note 84. 
 88. Letter from Daniel Castro, Senior Analyst, The Information Technology & Innovation 
Foundation, to Rick Boucher, Congressman, and, Cliff Stearns, Congressman, Subcomm. on 
Commc’ns, Tech. & the Internet, (May 25, 2010) [hereinafter ITIF Letter], available at 
http://www.itif.org/files/2010-privacy-legislation-comments.pdf. 
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service providers who would in turn pass this cost on to the consumer.89 
However, in a New York Times interview, Congressman Boucher 
disagreed with the assessment that this proposed provision would hinder 
businesses. He instead noted:  “Our goal is to enhance electronic 
commerce - we are not seeking in any way to disable targeted 
advertising.”90 
The proposed bill would delegate more authority to the FTC to 
implement and enforce informational privacy rights. The Commission 
would be responsible for the enforcement of the act91 and it would have 
the authority to amend or enact regulations to carry out the act.92 
Alternatively, because the proposed bill does not allow for a private 
right of action, the state attorney general could bring a claim on behalf 
of a citizen of the state.93 The Commission would still retain the 
authority to intervene, however.94 Moreover, if the FTC pursued a civil 
action against a defendant, the state attorney general would be 
prohibited from bringing a lawsuit.95  
The proposed Internet privacy bill also preempted state privacy 
laws.96 This provision was met with approval by the Information 
Technology & Innovative Foundation (ITIF), a non-partisan public 
policy think tank committed to advancing a pro-technology public 
policy agenda.97 In a letter to the Congressmen Boucher and Stearns, 
ITIF noted that a federal framework that established a single standard of 
law would make it easier for the private sector to meet compliance.98  
As Congress opened its 112th session in 2011, the issue of Internet 
privacy was gaining traction. This was due in part to President Obama’s 
November 2010 announcement that he planned to appoint a “privacy 
czar” to oversee the implementation of new privacy laws.99 The Obama 
administration took a more hands-on approach to Internet regulations 
compared to previous administrations because of the central role of 
personal information.100 Moreover, new congressional representatives, 
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who were likely to have a strong influence on Internet and data 
collection legislation, also expressed interest in the issue. In February 
2011, Jackie Speier, a congresswoman from California, introduced the 
“Do Not Track Me Online Act.”101 This bill would give the FTC the 
powers to create a national opt-out option for Internet users and to 
impose financial penalties for violations of the act.102 This “Do Not 
Track” mechanism is similar to one suggested by the FTC, which noted 
in December 2010:  
One way to facilitate consumer choice is to provide it in a uniform 
and comprehensive way . . . The most practical method of providing 
such universal choice would likely involve the placement of a 
persistent setting, similar to a cookie, on the consumer’s browser 
signaling the consumer’s choices about being tracked and receiving 
targeted ads. Commission staff supports this approach, sometimes 
referred to as a ‘Do Not Track.’103  
Thus, with such an emphasis on privacy issues, the 2010 draft bill was 
likely to be rewritten by the 112th Congress. 
 Furthermore, any revisions of the 2010 draft bill would likely 
take into account a December 2010 report dealing with online privacy 
written by the Department of Commerce Internet policy task force.104 
After a year-long review, the eighty-eight page report called for Internet 
businesses to develop a bill of rights to protect consumer data privacy.105 
The report also called for the Obama administration to form a new 
government office to oversee these privacy efforts.106 The Commerce 
Department, however, did not call for comprehensive privacy 
legislation. Rather, the report suggested that companies voluntarily 
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agree to comply with principles that protect consumer information.107 
Companies that complied with the voluntary code of conduct could 
receive safe harbor protection.108 Thus, the safe harbor would create 
broad protection for entities that demonstrated compliance with the code 
by providing those entities with certain immunities.109 Nonetheless, 
Secretary of Commerce Locke conceded that stronger enforcement is 
necessary for this self-regulation to work.110  
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
outlined a Code of Fair Information Practices (FIPPs)111 that would 
create “safeguard requirements” for certain “automated personal data 
systems” maintained by the Federal Government.112 The Commerce 
Department suggested that adoption of baseline FIPPs, akin to a 
“Privacy Bill of Rights,” would outline “a clear set of principles” that 
could guide “how companies collect and use personal information for 
commercial purposes.”113 The task force concluded that the proposed 
bill of rights would close gaps in the current policy, provide greater 
transparency, and increase certainty for businesses to reach 
compliance.114 The Commerce Department noted that an important 
concern of any regulation is its impact on the business sector.115 In fact, 
the FIPPs were designed to encourage innovation by businesses—a key 
factor in whether any privacy bill received Republican support.116 Thus, 
it was not surprising when Senators John McCain and John Kerry 
introduced yet another privacy bill that placed a three million dollar 
penalty cap for privacy violations.117  
Nevertheless, privacy advocacy groups argued that this 
accommodation of the business sector was not enough to protect 
Internet users and, moreover, was likely to only result in maintenance of 
the status quo. Jeff Chester, founder of the Center for Digital 
 
 107. See Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 41. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 44. 
 110. Jim Puzzanghera, U.S. Proposes Online Privacy Bill of Rights, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/16/business/la-fi-obama-privacy-20101217. 
 111. Commonly referred to as Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). 
 112. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 
§ 4 (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm; see 
also Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 11.  
 113. Consumer Privacy Press Release, supra note 105; see Commercial Data Privacy, supra 
note 104, at vii, 3–5, 11, 23–24, 70; Puzzanghera, supra note 110. 
 114. Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at vii. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011) § 404(c). 
  
280 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:267 
Democracy, noted that the proposed “framework is based on industry 
self-regulation.”118 Privacy advocates, however, desire stronger 
government regulation. As Susan Grant, director of consumer protection 
for the Consumer Federation of America said:  “It’s good that the 
Department of Commerce recognized we have a privacy problem, but 
the solution isn’t more self-regulation. We’ve tried that and it’s clearly 
inadequate. We need a privacy law that sets the rules of the road.”119 
III.  BACKGROUND OF E.U. LAW 
In contrast to the United States, privacy law in Europe has 
developed as a personal dignity rather than a liberty.120 The notion of 
privacy as a dignity is suggested by Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which protects the “right to respect for 
private and family life.”121 Furthermore, the European Union’s new 
Charter of Fundamental Rights protects both “respect for private and 
family life” and “protection of personal data.”122 In another example of 
the importance Europeans place upon informational privacy, the 
German state of Hesse drafted the world’s first data-protection law in 
1970.123 These examples illustrate that the European Union has taken a 
more regulatory role in informational privacy than the United States.124  
A.  European Union:  Umbrella Legislative Model That Provides a 
Uniform Approach to Data Collection Privacy Laws  
Europe has achieved legal uniformity for data collection through 
its directives.125 European Union directives are legislative acts that 
require member states to achieve a desired result.126 In turn, member 
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states must then adopt legislation that complies with the directives.127 
The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC gave member states until 1998 
to implement data collection legislation. The directive broadly defined 
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person . . . who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.”128 Member states were required to create a supervisory 
authority to monitor the state’s compliance with the directive.129 The 
supervisory authority has investigative powers as well as the power to 
engage in legal proceedings.130 The directive also allows for individuals 
to object to the processing of personal data for direct marketing 
purposes.131 Additionally, individual citizens can bring complaints of 
violations to the supervisory authority or the court, and are entitled to 
relief as a result of the unlawful processing of their personal data.132 
B.  United Kingdom:  Europe’s Least Stringent Data Collection Laws  
In 1998, the United Kingdom passed the Data Protection Act, 
which met the requirements of the EU directive.133 Although the UK 
laws met the requirements at the time of promulgation, UK data 
collection legislation is among Europe’s most relaxed. Consent, for 
example, is often deemed implied for non-sensitive data.134 Consent for 
sensitive data can take many forms, including written, oral, or by the 
clicking of a box.135 This is in contrast to Germany’s laws, which call 
for consent to be in writing.136 
In 2009, it was reported that the United Kingdom failed to properly 
implement eleven of the directive’s thirty-four articles, or nearly a third 
of the directive.137 Later that year the EU Telecoms Commission opened 
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an infringement proceeding against the United Kingdom.138 The 
Commission found that behavioral advertising, which monitors users’ 
Internet interests and then delivers targeted advertisements, was not 
properly regulated.139 In that instance, users were not properly informed 
of the data collection.140 Furthermore, the Telecoms Commission found 
that the United Kingdom lacked an independent national supervisory 
authority to oversee regulations.141 This incident highlighted aspects of 
the disharmony within the European Union: namely, compliance and 
enforcement of the directive by the member states.142  
A European Commission report highlighted the narrow approach 
that the United Kingdom has taken with regard to personal data.143 The 
Court of Appeal case Durant v. Financial Services Authority narrowed 
the definition of what constitutes personal data.144 There, the court found 
that personal data did not extend to information focusing on things other 
than the individual.145 Additionally, the United Kingdom made nuanced 
distinctions of when IP addresses constitute personal data. Rather than 
provide a bright-line rule, UK authorities have defined IP addresses as 
either “dynamic” or “static.”146 Static IP addresses are classified as 
personal data because they retain information regarding a particular 
individual.147 On the other hand, dynamic IP addresses contain 
information regarding a particular computer but are not linked to an 
individual user. Consequently, dynamic IP addresses do not fall within 
the definition of personal data.148 The EU report found that the UK 
approach deviates from that of other EU countries.149  
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) carries out 
enforcement of data protection in the United Kingdom.150 The UK 
government sponsors the ICO, raising doubts about whether this 
structure complies with the directive statute that ensures that the 
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supervisory authority acts with complete independence.151 The ICO 
commissioner lacks the power that other European states give to the 
supervisory authority. For instance, the ICO commissioner does not 
have autonomous power to demand access to data.152 Rather, the 
commissioner must first apply for a search warrant from a judge.153 In 
2006, the ICO applied for only seven such warrants.154  
Recently, however, the ICO commissioner has been granted more 
powers.155 The commissioner can now impose a monetary penalty.156 
Further, the ICO can now audit an organization’s data processing 
practices without the organization’s consent.157 Despite these new 
powers, the EU report expressed doubts that these measures would lead 
to stronger enforcement, in part, because the ICO has been reluctant to 
exercise its already-existing power.158 The report pointed specifically to 
the fact that the ICO generally investigates instances that are first 
exposed by the media.159 Moreover, most of the cases that had been 
brought to the attention of the ICO were simply dealt with by giving 
advice and guidance.160 Thus, the EU report concluded, these additional 
powers would likely only be exercised in the most egregious and easiest 
to prove data security breaches.161 
C.  Germany:  Europe’s Strictest Data Collection Laws  
Data collection regulations in Germany have a strong 
constitutional basis.162 After the region of Hesse adopted the world’s 
first data protection law in 1970, the first German federal law was 
passed seven years later. The subsequent development of these laws was 
reflected in the 1983 German Constitutional Court’s finding of a 
fundamental right to “informational self-determination” in the German 
constitution.163 Consequently, under the German constitution, an 
individual has the right to determine for himself the disclosure or use of 
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his personal information.164 Germany has continued to adopt strong 
privacy laws that protect the collection of informational data.165 Most 
scholars agree that the German stance on privacy is the result of the 
country’s history of Nazism.166 Today, there are sixteen general data 
protection laws in Germany and many other laws dealing with data 
protection in specific contexts or that otherwise bear on data 
protection.167 Thus, the result is a collection of data protection laws that 
is both detailed and technical. 
The German high court expressed its wariness of overreaching EU 
law when it approved the Treaty of Lisbon. There, the Constitutional 
Court stated in its June 2009 decision:   
If legal protection cannot be obtained at the Union level, the Federal 
Constitutional Court examines whether legal instruments of the 
European institutions and bodies keep within the boundaries of the 
sovereign powers accorded to them by way of conferral . . . [T]he 
fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign 
Member States . . . cannot be safeguarded in any other way.168  
Hence, the German Constitutional Court has retained the ultimate right 
to test the validity of European law under the German Constitution.169 
The issue of data collection is an area where the question of supremacy 
of constitutional or European law is likely to be raised. Because of the 
German Constitutional Court’s previous rulings, such a situation would 
result in the Court regarding any European rules that fall short of the 
Court’s standards as “invalid and unenforceable.”170  
In Germany, data protection often rests on complex “balance” 
provisions.171 The EC report noted, however, that this test is too 
vague.172 In several circumstances within the private sector, data 
processing for secondary purposes is allowed without consent.173 In 
these contexts, a balancing test is used that favors the private sector.174 
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This test, however, is also employed for the public sector.175 It is 
necessary to note that the EU Data Protection Directive allows for 
processing when it is “necessary for the performance of a task carried 
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority.”176 
Germany, however, has included stricter protection than the directive 
requires by implementing provisions that limit data collected 
specifically by the body carrying out the task.177 When the balance test 
is employed in these instances, the balance is “tilted against the public 
sector.”178 
Nevertheless, the enforcement system in Germany is not as strong 
as might be expected. In the public sector, the role of the federal and 
state data protection commissioners is limited.179 For example, the 
federal commissioner can demand a formal review but cannot order 
specific changes.180 Thus, the commissioner’s role is not one of 
significant legal power. Conversely, in the private sector, supervisory 
authorities are granted extensive powers of investigation and 
enforcement.181 The supervisory authority can demand “any information 
which the supervisory authority needs for the fulfillment of its task,”182 
and the information must be provided without delay.183 Moreover, the 
authority can carry out inspections of documents and personal data 
files.184 With regard to enforcement, the supervisory authority can set a 
deadline for the compliance of certain measures and impose 
administrative fines.185 
In 2009, Germany enacted additional amendments to the Federal 
Data Protection Act. These amendments required notification of data 
security breaches and strengthened regulation of data marketers.186 
Additionally, the amendments increased fines from €25,000 to €50,000 
for violations of the law.187 These changes also strengthened the power 
of the data protection authorities. For example, when a data controller 
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notifies the supervisory authority about a breach, an investigation will 
be launched followed by stiffer fines.188   
Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider the context of a modern 
technological society in which EU data collection laws operate. 
Germany, for instance, had a population of over 81 million in 2010.189 
All versions of the iPhone sold out within days.190 There were an 
estimated 7.7 million German Facebook users as of May 2010.191 
Although Germany was the only country to offer an opt-out option for 
Google’s Street View service before its launch, only an estimated 
250,000 people, or three percent of the population, exercised this 
option.192 In fact, some Germans embraced the Street View mapping, 
with the mayor and tourist board of Oberstaufen, Germany inviting 
Google to put their town on the map and even baking a cake for the 
occasion.193  
The United Kingdom, with less stringent data collection laws, has 
experienced much of the same consumer behavior. As of March 2011, 
for instance, there were 30 million Facebook users in the United 
Kingdom, which has a population of about 63 million.194 Thus, 
consumer behavior in both the United Kingdom and Germany illustrate 
a growing disconnect with Germany’s strict data collection laws. 
IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND E.U. DATA COLLECTION 
PRIVACY LAWS 
A.  The Proposed United States Internet Bill is the Functional 
Equivalent of an EU Directive, But Would Eliminate the Disharmony 
Within EU Laws 
By analyzing the EU approach to data collection privacy laws, the 
United States can gain valuable insight. The EU’s blanket legislation 
provides member states with uniform standards. This system is not 
infallible, however. In fact, there is much disharmony of data protection 
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laws within the EU. Thus, the United States should be mindful of the 
strengths and limitations of the E.U. system when adopting new data 
collection privacy laws.  
The proposed May 2010 U.S. Internet privacy bill provides a 
blanket federal law that serves as the functional equivalent of an E.U. 
directive.195 Thus, the promulgation of a federal law would provide 
states with a uniform standard. While the EU has implemented uniform 
standards, there has been disharmony with the variation and 
enforcement of these standards. It should be noted, however, that the 
proposed U.S. bill includes a preemption clause, allowing the law to 
supersede conflicting state regulations. This move toward national 
uniformity could avoid the disharmony the EU experiences with 
regulation and enforcement of data protection laws.196  
1.  Disharmony Within EU Law:  Variations of Standards  
Although EU Member States enact legislation with similar 
wording, application of these laws varies significantly, often resulting in 
disharmony.197 This is in part because countries apply different tests, 
ranging from “reasonable expectations,” “fairness,” or even “balancing” 
tests.198 Another divergence occurs when countries delineate exceptions 
for the public sector. UK law, for instance, makes exceptions for 
broadly defined “policing purposes.”199 On the other hand, Germany 
provides exceptions for more tailored instances that include “countering 
immediate threats,” “general and specific prevention,” and 
“investigation and prosecution of [suspected] criminal offences.”200 
Moreover, these differences are further exacerbated when the 
adjudication of multi-national issues is necessary.201 
2.  Disharmony Within EU Law:  Enforcement of Standards 
One shortcoming of EU law was addressed in a March 2010 
opinion paper that examined the principle of accountability and 
enforcement of data collection rights in Europe.202 The Article 29 
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Working Party that was responsible for this opinion was concerned 
about whether the implementation of data protection requirements 
resulted in effective mechanisms, and, in turn, delivered real protection 
to Internet users.203 As the opinion paper noted, the Article 29 Working 
Party wanted to move from “theory to practice.”204 With this in mind, 
the paper advanced a proposal for accountability that would require data 
controllers to put in place appropriate and effective measures to ensure 
compliance with the principles and obligations set forth in the directive 
and to further demonstrate such compliance to the member state’s 
supervisory authorities.205  
 While the new proposal does not introduce any requirements that 
do not already exist under current law, it does set forth provisions that 
ensure compliance. For instance, Directive 2002/58 was amended in 
2009 and called for “the implementation of a security policy with 
respect to the processing of personal data.”206 The Working Party report 
is evidence of the need for clear legal standards ensuring Member States 
meet both the standards and implementation requirements of the data 
protection directives.207 
3.  The Need for a Preemption Clause 
The disharmony within the EU is an excellent example of the need 
for clear, cohesive laws. A blanket federal law in the United States 
would create a clear standard with which states can comply. With the 
inclusion of a preemption clause, this umbrella legislation could help 
the United States avoid some of the disharmony EU countries face. 
Such a clause would preempt state privacy laws. Although some states 
have given citizens more privacy rights through legislation, these laws 
have been narrowly tailored to combat a single problem like spam e-
mail messages or telemarketers.208 Thus, states have not provided 
comprehensive data protection legislation. Nevertheless, a blanket data 
collection law with a preemption clause would provide a clear standard 
for all fifty states. 
The Commerce Department’s 2010 report called for a narrowly 
tailored preemption clause.209 Citing concerns of businesses, the report 
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suggested that states could provide remedies more quickly and take into 
consideration developing technologies when enacting legislation.210 One 
proposal was to limit preemption to state laws that addressed the same 
subject matter.211 Another suggestion called for the state attorneys 
general to enforce federal law while preserving state laws.212  
Compliance is only one aspect of the problems the EU faces. 
Enforcement of data protection laws has proven to be another 
challenge.213 Under the current U.S. system, the FTC holds regulatory 
power but only regulates for “unfairness” and “deception” practices.214 
Thus, any effective data collection legislation will require a regulating 
authority with more power. This could be accomplished by either 
granting the FTC more regulatory authority or by creating a separate 
commission with more authority. It should be noted that all the recent 
legislative bills that have been introduced have proposed granting the 
FTC more regulatory authority.215  
In its task force report, the Commerce Department suggested that 
the FTC remain the primary enforcement agency.216 The report called 
for the creation of an authority to convene business and civil society 
groups to develop effective, consensus-based voluntary codes.217 The 
proposed authority, called the Privacy Policy Office (PPO), would work 
alongside the FTC, but it would have no enforcement authority of its 
own.218 Instead, the PPO would serve as a center of commercial data 
privacy policy expertise.219 The office would also help foster policy that 
takes into consideration the potential effects on both businesses and 
consumers. For instance, the PPO would suggest where new industry 
privacy codes are needed based on consumer complaints, research, and 
industry initiatives.220 The creation of the PPO demonstrates the 
Commerce Department’s recognition of the need for stronger 
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regulations. It further illustrates that privacy policies must be enforced 
by a single, powerful entity if effective data collection laws are to be 
accomplished.  
B.  Effective Legislation:  The Delineation  
of Consistent Consent and Opt-Out Policies 
For the successful implementation of effective data protection 
legislation, the United States will have to delineate consistent consent 
and opt-out policies. The varying levels of consent within the United 
States’ current laws demonstrate the uneven landscape of data 
protection.221 In fact, an EU study noted that inconsistent levels of 
consent in U.S. law resulted in large gaps within privacy laws.222 This 
problem is not exclusive to the United States, however. The EU has also 
encountered similar problems. This is exemplified by the disparity 
between laws in the UK and Germany. For example, consent is often 
deemed implied in the UK.223 Germany, however, stipulates that consent 
is “only valid if it is based on the free decision of the person 
concerned.”224 Thus, to create cohesive legislation, the United States 
will have to adopt clearly defined policies.  
Any proposal of new data collection laws will surely meet 
resistance from the business sector. In January 2011, it was reported that 
Facebook changed its lobbying status in Washington, D.C. because 
stronger privacy legislation was being debated.225 Current laws allow 
businesses to use personal information without consent and without 
giving individuals the opportunity to opt-out.226 Furthermore, companies 
are allowed to vaguely state their privacy policies.227 These practices 
have occurred largely because the business sector is allowed substantial 
latitude. As the Commerce Department’s report cites, the commercial 
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sector is given deference because the government does not want to stifle 
innovation.228 Thus, with such an emphasis placed on economic 
considerations, the United States may not be able to adopt EU-like data 
protection laws.229  
C.  Effective Legislation:  The Implementation  
of Remedial Measures for Individuals 
The proposed U.S. bill does not provide a right of action for 
individuals.230 Although this approach is similar to that of the EU, a 
recent EU report called for improving this provision. In the report, the 
Commission advocated for individual rights and remedies that were 
effective, speedy, and cheap.231 The report further noted the need for 
specific remedial rights to be outlined in any upcoming amendments.232 
To improve the situation in the EU, the report also called for non-
governmental and civil groups to be granted standing so they can bring 
actions on behalf of individuals.233 Moreover, the report noted that class 
action lawsuits in the United States should serve as a model for how the 
EU legal system could better provide individuals with remedies for their 
grievances.234  
Finally, another issue addressed by the Commission was damages. 
The Commission urged liquidated damages to be higher than the cost of 
non-compliance.235 This would incentivize entities to comply with the 
directions in the law. These recommendations underscore the 
shortcomings of remedies that are currently available to individuals in 
the EU system. Therefore, before doing away with an individual’s 
redress, U.S. legislators should consider the implications of such 
measures.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In any comparative analysis of privacy laws, it is necessary to note 
that European and American notions of privacy differ. Furthermore, 
while scholars have debated the origin of American notions of privacy, 
such an origin is unlikely to be monocausal.236 Thus, a fierce protection 
of the home, a distrust of the government, or a misunderstanding of the 
commercial sector’s privacy protection practices is unlikely to be the 
singular source of American notions of privacy.237  
European privacy has developed as a “personal dignity,” whereas 
privacy within the United States has developed as a “liberty.”238 Privacy 
laws within the United States have protected individuals from intrusions 
by the State and have provided protection for decisional privacy.239 
Informational privacy, however, has not received such protection and is 
regulated by a patchwork system of federal and state laws.240 The result 
is a system that lacks consistent and cohesive standards.  
An incident with the social networking site Facebook illustrates 
the notion that consumers’ desire more protection for their personal 
information. Facebook experienced widespread user revolt when users 
became aware of the website’s new news feed, its “Beacon” service, 
and changes in the terms of its service policy.241 The “Beacon” service 
allowed a user’s Facebook “friends” to track the user’s “purchases on 
partner websites,”242 and the “news feed” feature allowed “friends” to 
track a user’s use of the website.243 The changes in the company’s terms 
of service gave Facebook a “perpetual license for user-submitted 
content,” even after an account was terminated.244 While these policies 
were not unusual for Internet companies in the United States,245 
Facebook users expressed their discomfort with the company’s 
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policies.246 This example suggests that “Americans would object to 
many common business uses of personal information.” 247 
Similarly, Apple received criticism in April 2011, when it was 
reported that its iPhones and iPads recorded and collected user location 
data.248 The revelation caused an outcry from users and privacy 
watchdogs alike.249 Apple responded by providing a software update and 
releasing a statement noting that it was not tracking the location of 
users’ iPhones, but merely collecting information to improve its location 
and traffic information databases.250 The episode highlighted the fact 
that while users are willing to share this information as part of a service, 
this information is deemed sensitive enough that users do not want the 
information recorded.251 Thus, the Facebook and Apple examples 
further indicate the balance that must be struck with privacy in a digital 
age.  
As the United States adopts new data collection laws, it may look 
to the EU as a model. Although the EU provides cohesive data 
collection laws, its system is not infallible. When analyzing the UK and 
Germany, a disparity of standards between the countries is evident. 
Germany has some of the strictest data collection laws in the world, 
while the UK has some of the least stringent. Moreover, enforcement of 
EU directives is, at times, uneven. Lastly, the EU system places 
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limitations on an individual’s redress.  
Thus, while the EU system provides an adoptable model, these 
shortcomings should be considered when implementing new data 
collection legislation in the United States. Accordingly, a successful bill 
would provide the FTC with more regulatory authority. Such a bill 
would also need to delineate specific consent and opt-out policies. 
Finally, any new legislation should include a preemption clause 
allowing for easier compliance and enforcement. 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote The Right to 
Privacy, a seminal law review article that called for the creation of 
privacy rights in an era marked by the invention of photography and the 
rise of tabloid journalism.252 In the years that have passed, privacy has 
morphed into a constitutional right—one that encompasses 
contraception and abortion.253 And while privacy within a digital age 
remains nuanced, there is still a role for regulation. Certainly, there are 
competing factors—consumer attitudes and the commercial sector’s 
concerns—that must be resolved. Data collection laws, however, can be 
implemented to provide Americans with broader protection while taking 
into account consumer attitudes in a modern digital age.    
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